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Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law
Fred H. Cate'
I.

INTRODUCTION

"It was the best of times, it was the worst of times."' Charles Dickens' description
of revolutionary Europe in A Tale of Two Cities might very well be used to describe
organ transplantation today. Enormous successes are paralleled by a fatal and worsening
shortage of organs, discontent, and disquieting uncertainty about the future.
In 1993 there were 13,540 cadaveric, solid organ transplants in the United States.'
Since 1980 almost 150,000 solid organ transplants have been performed in this country3 and, since 1985, more than one million tissue transplants.4 The number of transplant programs in the United States has more than doubled since 198. s The effectiveness of transplantation is demonstrated both by the long-term survival rates of transplant
patients and by the quality of life transplantation restores. By 1991, the ten-year survival rate of patients with cadaveric kidney transplants was eighty percent.6 The five-year
survival rate for more recently developed procedures was eighty percent for pancreas
recipients, sixty-seven percent for heart recipients, and sixty-three percent for adult liver
recipients. 7 Although transplantation is expensive, the cost effectiveness of transplant
procedures is equal to, or greater than, many other accepted medical treatments, such as
those for cancer, severe bums, and dialysis for end-stage renal disease.' That is real
success, measured in terms of lives saved and improved, families reunited, and hope
restored.

1. J.D., Stanford University. Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of LawBloomington; Senior Fellow, The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of
Northwestern University; Of Counsel, Fields & Director, P.C.; A.B., J.D., Stanford University. Professor Cate
is the author of Death and Organ Donation, in Matthew Bender's TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW (1991 &
Supp. 1992) (with Alexander M. Capron), TRANSPLANTATION WHITE PAPER (1991) (with Susan Laudicina),
and numerous articles on transplantation. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the Coalition on Donation and of the Communications Committee of the United Network for Organ Sharing. An earlier version of
this Article was presented to the American Bar Association Presidential Showcase Program, Organ Donation
and Transplantation: What is the Lawyers' Role?, San Francisco, August 10, 1992."
1. CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CreES 1 (1859).
2. Facts About Transplantation in the United States-Cadaveric Donor Transplants, UNOS UPDATE,
Dec. 1993, at 35.
3. Id.; see also ROGER W. EVANS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE TRANSPLANTATION STUDY 2 (1991).
4. John Schwartz, FDA Sets New Rules to Ensure Safety of Tissue for Transplants, WASH. POST, Dec.
11, 1993, at AT.
5. EVANS, supra note 3, at 4.
6. Id. at 17.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 15-21, 59-62.
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Despite impressive successes, transplantation is sharply curtailed by a shortage of
donated organs and tissues. The number of people who either die of conditions for
which transplantation is indicated or are maintained on suboptimal therapies in the
absence of a transplant far exceeds the number of transplants performed.9 For example,
in 1990, 18,592 people needed a transplanted kidney (only half received one); 40,959
needed a heart (only one in twenty received one); 14,751 needed a liver (only one in
five received one); 4108 needed a pancreas (only one in eight got one); and 4618 needed a combination heart-lung (fewer than one in eighty-five received one)."
Not all people who would benefit from a transplant actually are listed on the waiting list. Nonetheless, the number of registrations on the national list far exceeds the
current supply and is increasing. As of December 31, 1993, there were 24,973 registrations for a kidney, 2834 for a heart, 2997 for a liver, 1106 for a pancreas or combination kidney-pancreas, 1240 for a lung, and 202 for a combination heart-lung." In short,
the demand for organs is far outstripping the supply, and the gap is widening; more
than 33,000 people are on the waiting list. 2 In the case of lifesaving organs such as
will die before an
hearts, this means that one-third or more of those people waiting
3
organ is found. Every four hours a person dies while waiting.'
In addition, one can hardly pick up the morning paper without seeing a horror story
involving transplantation. Controversies abound over racially based directed donations,1 4 families billed for hospital charges related to donation, 5 transplant programs
and surgeons under investigation for illegal drug sales and profit-making, 6 public officials moving up on waiting lists, 7 dramatic disparities in waiting times based on
race, 18 transplant programs and medical examiners fighting over dead bodies, 9 wide
variances in costs and charges for organ procurement and transplant procedures,' and
the transmission of AIDS and other infectious diseases through transplantation.2

9. Id. at 8-9.
10. EVANS, supra note 3, at 9, table 5.
11. Patients Waiting for Transplants, UNOS UPDATE, Jan. 1994, at 38.
12. Frank P. Stuart & Diana Clark, The Benefits of Cooperation in Organ Donation, WASH. POST, Dec.
16, 1993 (letter to the editor), at A24.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Jeff Testerman, Should Donors Say Who Gets Organs?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 9,
1994, at IA.
15. See, e.g., Ann Landers, Sending Organ Donor a Bill Was Mistake, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Dec. 27,
1993, at 2E. This story was reported in Ann Landers' column of December 27, 1993, and was widely reported
throughout the United States.
16. See, e.g., Christopher Anderson, Scandal Scars Minnesota Medical School, Sci., Dec. 17, 1993, at
1812. The University of Minnesota and transplant surgeon John Najarian were investigated by the FDA, FBI,
IRS, and U.S. Attorney's office for producing and selling the immunosuppressive drug antilymphocyte globulin (ALG) without FDA approval. Id.
17. See, e.g., Claudia Coates, Casey's Quick Transplant Renews Ethics Debate, L.A. TIMES, July 25,
1993, at A3.
18. See, e.g., David Bauder, Blacks Wait Longer for Kidneys, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at A22.
19. See, e.g., Sally Squires, Two Agencies in a Grim Battle Over Bodies, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at
Cl; Sally Squires, Transplant Tug-of-War, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1993, at Z7.
20. See, e.g., Roger W. Evans, Organ Procurement Expenditures and the Role of Financial Incentives,
269 JAMA 3113 (1993); EVANS, supra note 3, at 24.
21. See, e.g., Lawrence Altman, 3 Die of AIDS After Getting Organs From a Man Infected With the
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Law and lawyers have proven to be a mixed blessing in human organ transplantation. Although law is in many ways responsible for the success of transplantation, most
notably through the Uniform Determination of Death and Uniform Anatomical Gift
Acts,' law is also one of transplantation's greatest impediments. This Article examines
the primary laws applicable to organ donation and transplantation and recommends
renewed attention to three roles for law and lawyers in the future.
I.

SOURCES OF TRANSPLANT LAW

A. Early Regulation by States
State legislatures adopted the earliest regulatory measures to facilitate transplantation. As advances in medical technology made the widespread transplantation of hearts
and kidneys feasible, these institutions sought to encourage the donation of organs and
to provide a legal framework for organ donation and transplantation.
1. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
In the 1960s the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
began the process of formulating a model organ donation act. In 1968 the Conference
adopted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).23 By 1972 some version of the
UAGA had been adopted in every state and in the District of Columbia.'

Virus, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1991, at 8; B.J. Pereira et al., Liver Disease and HCV Infection After Transplantation of Organs From Hepatitis C Antibody Positive Donors, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 1458 (1993); B.J.
Pereira et al., Transmission of Hepatitis C Virus by Organ Transplantation,325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 454
(1991).
22. UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH AcT, 12 U.L.A. 414 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter UDDA]; UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT OF 1987, 8A U.L.A. 19 (1993) [hereinafter UAGA]. All UAGA cites are to UAGA
OF 1987, 1993 edition unless otherwise noted.
23. UAGA OF 1968, 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993) (superseded by UAGA OF 1987).
24. ALA. CODE §§ 22-19-40 to -47, -60 (1975 & Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.50.010-.090 (Supp.
1987); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-841 to -849 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-17-601 to -613 (Michie
1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7150-7156.5 (Deering Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-34101 to -109 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-270 to -288 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§§ 2710-2719 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1501 to -1511 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 732.910-.922
(West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-5-140 to -151 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327-1 to -9 (1985);
IDAHO CODE §§ 39-3401 to -3417 (1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 , paras. 301-3111 (1991); IND. CODE
§§ 29-2-16-1 to -12 (1993); IOWA CODE §§ 142A.1-.10 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3209 to -3217
(1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.165-.235 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:2351-:2359 (West 1982); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2901-2910 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN.
EST. & TRusTs §§ 4-501-512 (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 113, §§ 7-14 (1992);'MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 333.10101-.10109 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. §§ 525.921-.9224 (1992 & Supp. 1993); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-39-11, 41-39-31 to -53 (1972 & Supp. 1994); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 194.210-.290 (1986 & Supp. 1993);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-17-101 to -312 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-4801 to -4818 (1990 & Supp.
1993); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 451.500-.590 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 291-A:1 to -A:9 (1987);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:6-57 to -65 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-6-1 to -11 (Michie
1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4300-4308 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A402 to -412.1 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.2-01 to -12 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.01-.10
(Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2201-2218 (1991 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.250-.290
(1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 8601-8607 (1975 & Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-18.6-1 to -15
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The UAGA provides that any individual who is at least eighteen years old may
make or refuse to make an anatomical gift.' Where a decedent has neither executed an
anatomical gift form nor indicated opposition to such a gift, the UAGA provides that
certain people may authorize a gift of all or part of the decedent's body.' Those persons must fall within one of six hierarchical classes of individuals who can authorize a
donation: a spouse, adult son or daughter, parent, adult sibling, grandparent, guardian,"
or any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body.' An individual may authorize the gift only if no member of a prior class is available at the time
of death, and no actual notice of opposition by any member of the same or a prior class
is evident.29
According to the UAGA, "[ain anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor
before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any
person after the donor's death."' The donation of a specific body part is not presumed
to be a refusal to give other parts, should the next-of-kin consent to other body parts
being donated." Similarly, the revocation by the donor of an anatomical gift is not
presumed to be a refusal of the donor to make a subsequent anatomical gift, should the
next-of-kin consent.32
The UAGA defines who may receive human body part donations and for what
purposes as:
1. a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization, for transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or dental science;
2. an accredited medical or dental school, college, or university for education, research, advancement of medical or dental science; or
3. a designated individual for transplantation or therapy needed by that
individual.33
The UAGA provides that human body parts may be donated through a will or by
another document.' If the gift is through a will, it becomes effective upon death and
does not have to wait for probate. 5 If the donation is by another document, most com-

(1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-43-310 to -400 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 34-26-20
to -41 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-30-101 to -111 (1992); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 692.001-.016 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-28-1 to -12 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§ 5238-5247 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-289 to -297.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994); WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 68.50.520-.630 & §§ 68.50.901-.903 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE-§§ 16-19-1 to -9 (1991);
WIS. STAT. § 157.06 (1991-92); Wyo. STAT. §§ 35-5-101 to -112 (1994).
25. UAGA § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 33.
26. Id. § 3(a), at 40.
27. Id. § 4(a), at 43.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 3(b), at 40.
30. UAGA § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. at 34.
31. Id. § 2(j), at 34.
32. Id. § 2(k), at 34.
33. Id. § 6(a), at 53.
34. Id. § 2, at 33-34.
35. UAGA § 2(e), 8A U.L.A. at 34.
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monly a donor card, the 1968 UAGA required that the document be signed in the presence of two witnesses; today, however, witnesses no longer are required unless the
intent to donate is expressed orally.' Under the UAGA, a donor may, but is not obligated to, specify a recipient of the anatomical gift." The donor may revoke a gift at
8
any time, even if notice of the intent to donate was given to a specified donee.
Where donation does take place, the UAGA requires that the organ or tissue be taken
without unnecessary mutilation and that the decedent's body be returned to the family
or the person who is under obligation to dispose of the body." Furthermore, any person who acts in good faith in accordance with the terms of the UAGA or of any state's
or nation's anatomical gift laws is not liable for civil damages or subject to criminal
prosecution for his or her act.'
In 1984, the Executive Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws began the process of drafting a new UAGA in response to the
increasingly visible inadequacies of the 1968 Act. In 1987 the Conference approved the
new UAGA; the American Bar Association approved the Act in 1988. The 1987 UAGA
contains an entirely new section entitled "Routine Inquiry and Required Request; Search
and Notification."' This section requires that a hospital ask each patient on admission:
"Are you an organ or tissue donor?"' 2 If the answer is affirmative, the hospital is to
request a copy of the document of gift.43 If the answer is negative, the hospital, with
the consent of the attending physician, "shall discuss with the patient the option to make
or refuse to make an anatomical gift."' If the patient is at or near death, and no medical record indicates that the patient has made or refused to make an anatomical gift, the
hospital is directed to consider approaching the next-of-kin about human body part
donation.45
The section also obligates law enforcement officers, firemen, paramedics, other
emergency rescuers, and hospital personnel to "make a reasonable search for a document of gift or other information identifying the bearer as a donor or as an individual
who has refused to make an anatomical gift." The penalty for failing to comply with
the section is neither criminal nor civil liability, but rather "appropriate administrative
sanctions.'"' The first two states to pass this "required request" legislation were New
York and Oregon in 1985. By January of 1992, forty-six states and the District of Columbia had enacted some form of required request legislation.4

§

36. Id. § 2,at 35 (comment).
37. Id. § 6(b), at 53.
38. Id. § 2(f)(4), at 34.
39. ld § 8(a), at 55.
40. UAGA § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. at 47.
41. Id.§ 5, at 47.
42. Id § 5(a), at 47.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. UAGA § 5(b), 8A U.L.A. at 47.
46. Id.§ 5(c), at 47.
47. Id.§ 5(M, at 47.
48. ALA. CODE § 22-19-142 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 13.50.014 (Supp. 1991); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.
36-849 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-605 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.5
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The 1987 UAGA also forbids the purchase or sale of a body part for transplantation or therapy for "valuable consideration ... if removal of the part is intended to
occur after the death of the decedent."49 The Act defines "valuable consideration" consistent with the National Organ Transplant Act, discussed below,' to exclude "reasonable payment for the removal, processing, disposal, preservation, quality control, storage, transportation, or implantation of a part."'"
2. Determinationof Death
A second area for early state regulation of transplantation involved the definition of
"death." In order for organs to be viable for transplantation, both circulation and respiration must be maintained in the host body. Death must therefore be determined by the
absence of all brain activity. Prior to 1970, no state statute permitted such a determination of death. Doctors and hospitals risked liability if they removed artificial life support
systems from a body based on the absence of brain activity and lack of response to
stimuli. The UAGA contained no definition of "brain death" because of the drafters'
concern that the controversy surrounding the issue of brain death in the 1960s would
delay states' passage of the Act. Instead, the UAGA merely provided that death shall be
determined by a physician who will not participate in the removal or transplantation of
any of the decedent's body parts. 2
In 1980, however, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated its Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA),-3 and both the
ABA and the AMA approved it the following year. Recommended by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, the UDDA provides: "An individual who has sustained either (1) irre-

(Deering Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-34-108.5 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-279e
(West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2721 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1509 to 2-1511
(1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.922 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-143 (Supp. 1994); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 327-5 to 327-51 (Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-3406 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para.
60/2 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE § 29-2-16-10 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-3218 (1992); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.241 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2354.4(B) (West Supp.
1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2910 (West 1992); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 113, § 8 (1992); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.10102a (1992); MINN. STAT. § 525.9214 (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-15 (1993); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 194.233 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-5-212 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-4817 (1990); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 451.577 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 291-A:2-a (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-58.1 (West
Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-6-10 (Michie 1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4351 (McKinney Supp.
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-412.1 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06.2-05 (Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2108.021 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2214 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.268
(1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 8608 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-18.6-5 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-31-10 (Supp. 1991); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 692.013 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 26-28-6 (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5241 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-292.1 (Michie
Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.500 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 16-19-4a (1991); Wis.
STAT. § 157.06 (1992); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-5-114 (Michie 1994).
49. UAGA § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. at 58.
50. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
51. UAGA § 10(b), 8A U.L.A. at 58.
52. Id. § 8(b), at 56.
53. UDDA. 12 U.L.A. 414 (Supp. 1994).
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versible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation
of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of
death must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards."'
Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes recognizing
irreversible cessation of all brain functions as an acceptable method of determining
death for legal as well as medical purposes." Six states-Arizona,' Massachusetts,;"
Nebraska,"8 New Jersey,59 New York,' and Washington 6 -recognize "brain death"
by judicial determination rather than by statute. For instance, in State v. Watson,' the
New Jersey high court held that evidence that the victim had no brain activity prior to

removal from life support systems was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction
for homicide. The New York State Court of Appeals followed this reasoning in People
v. Eulo and People v. Bonilla. 3 In both cases, the victims were organ donors and the
court directly addressed the need to develop a brain-death standard in order to facilitate
organ procurement. The appellate court reviewing the cases rejected the idea that its
recognition of the need "to ease and make more efficient the transfer of donated organs," rendered its brain-death criteria theoretically impure.'

54. Id. § I, at 414.
55. ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17101 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering Supp. 1994); COLO.REV. STAT. § 12-3624, § 1760 (1987); D.C.
136 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-504a (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 382.009 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1991);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 327C-1 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 50/2
(Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE § 1-1-4-3 (1993); IOWA CODE § 702.8 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202
(1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.400 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:111
(West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN. HEALT-GEN. § 5-202
(1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1033 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. § 145.135 (1993); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-36-3 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.005 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-22-101 (1993); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 451.007 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141-D:2 (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (Michie
Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.3-01 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.30 (Baldwin 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-301(g) (West 1991); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 432.300 (1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10203 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-16 (1989); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-43-460 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS55.55.34-25-18.1 (1994); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-3-501 (1992); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 671.001(b) (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 2634-2 (1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5218 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.7 (Michie Supp. 1987); W.
VA. CODE § 16-10-1 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West 1989); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-19-101 (Michie
1994).
56. State v. Fierro, 603 P.2d 74 (Ariz. 1979).
57. Commonwealth v. Golston, 366 N.E.2d 744 (Mass. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
58. State v. Meints, 322 N.W.2d 809 (Neb. 1982).
59. State v. Watson, 467 A.2d 590 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
60. People v. Eulo, 472 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1984).
61. In re Bowman, 617 P.2d 731 (Wash. 1980).
62. 467 A.2d at 590-91.
63. 472 N.E.2d at 294. Eulo and Bonilla were decided together on appeal.
64. Id. at 292
65. Id. at 295 n.28.

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Fall

B. The Growth of Federal Regulation
1. The National Organ TransplantAct
Raymond Cotton and Andrew Sandier observed in 1986 that "[tihe most striking
aspect of the legal environment surrounding the procurement and transplantation of
human organs is the virtual absence of federal regulation." The primary federal regulation stems from the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA or the Act),6' which
Congress passed and President Reagan signed in 1984.
NOTA was the product of a series of hearings conducted by House and Senate
committees of the 98th Congress. In June 1983, Surgeon General Koop convened a
workshop entitled "Solid Organ Procurement for Transplantation: Educating the Physician and the Public." Legislation regulating organ procurement and transplantation subsequently was introduced in both the House and Senate. House and Senate Conferees
met in October of 1984 and produced a compromise measure that was enacted as NOTA.
NOTA has six principal provisions. The Act:
1. established a 25-member task force on Organ Procurement and Transplantation responsible for examining a broad range of "medical, legal,
ethical, economic, and social issues presented by human organ procurement and transplantation;" '
2. required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to convene a
conference on the feasibility of establishing a national registry of voluntary bone marrow donors;'
3. created the Division of Organ Transplantation;"
4. empowered the Secretary to make grants for the planning, creation,
initial operation, and expansion of organ procurement organizations
(OPOs); " l
5. required the Secretary to contract for an Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) and a Scientific Registry;"2 and
6. prohibited the purchase and sale of human organs for "valuable consideration."73
The latter four requirements have had the most lasting consequences.

66. Raymond Cotton & Andrew Sandler, The Regulation of Organ Procurement and Transplantation in
the United States, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 57 (1986).
67. See National Organ Transplant.Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter NOTA].
68. Id. § 101(b)(1)(A). The Task Force's report was published in 1986. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1986) [hereinafter TASK FORCE).
69. NOTA § 401(a).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 274c (1988).
71. Id.§ 273a.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 274-274a (Supp. V 1993).
73. Id. § 274e.
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a. Division of Organ Transplantation
NOTA mandated the creation of "an identifiable administrative unit in the Public
Health Service" to administer the Act, coordinate organ procurement activities, encourage organ donation, and report to Congress about the status of organ procurement and
transplantation.74 The Secretary of Health and Human Services responded by creating
the Division of Organ Transplantation (DOT). Today the DOT is responsible for the
7
The DOT's two
OPTN and Scientific Registry contracts and grants to OPOs
branches-the Operations and Analysis Branch and the Public and Professional Education Branch-also have expanded their public, media, and professional education activities, oversight of both the OPTN and the Scientific Registry, and exploration of current
issues in transplantation, such as participation by minority communities and better coordination among organ and tissue organizations. The DOT's responsibilities relating to
76
OPOs, the OPTN, and the Scientific Registry are discussed in greater detail below.
b. Organ Procurement Organizations
NOTA enshrined OPOs as the backbone of the organ procurement and distribution
system. First established in a 1968 pilot program in Boston and Los Angeles, OPOs
flourished with the creation of the federal government's End-Stage Renal Disease Program through which federal funds became available for kidney procurement and distribution.77 NOTA authorized twenty-five million dollars for grants to "qualified"
OPOs.7" The DOT has awarded grants each year, beginning in 19862" Between the
End-Stage Renal Disease Program and the OPO grant program, OPOs, although they
are private organizations, receive significant federal funding. This level of funding
naturally has led to OPOs increasingly becoming subject to federal regulations. In the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986,' Congress expanded federal regulation
of OPOs by subjecting all OPOs to the authority of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and requiring all OPOs, as a condition of participating in Medicare, to be
members of and agree to abide by the rules of the OPTN.

74.

Id. § 274c.

75. See Transplant Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-616, 104 Stat. 3283 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
76.

See infra part II.B.l.b-c.

77. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991, 86 Star. 1329, 1463-64 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
78. NOTA § 201.
79. Grants To Increase Organ Donation, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,673 (1993); National Organ Transplant Act;
Grants To Increase Organ Donation, 57 Fed. Reg. 18,158 (1992); National Organ Transplant Act; Grants To

Increase Organ Donation, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,433 (1991); National Organ Transplant Act; Grants for Organ
Procurement, 55 Fed. Reg. 24,935 (1990); National Organ Transplant Act; Grants for Organ Procurement, 54
Fed. Reg. 20,438 (1989); National Organ Transplant Act; Grants for Organ Procurement, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,601
(1988); National Organ Transplant Act; Grants for Organ Procurement, 52 Fed. Reg. 19,406 (1987); National

Organ Transplant Act; Grants for Organ Procurement, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,509 (1986).
80.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, 2009-10 (codified

in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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c. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and Scientific Registry
In a compromise provision of NOTA, Congress opted for the creation of a private
organization to maintain the list of people waiting for organs. While delegating that task
to a government entity likely would have guaranteed federal oversight of organ procurement and distribution generally, the Reagan Administration objected to any measure that
might create more government bureaucracy. Congress therefore created the OPTN as a
private monopoly, funded by taxpayer dollars and user fees, and required that it be
operated only by organizations working exclusively in transplantation.
According to the Act, the OPTN is designed to establish a national list of individuals who need organs and a national computer system to match available organs with
individuals on that list. The Network must also maintain a twenty-four-hour telephone
service to assist with the matching process, to adopt standards of quality for the acquisition and transportation of donated organs, and to collect and distribute information on
organ donation and transplantation."' NOTA provided that no more than two million
dollars per fiscal year may be spent to support the Network."2
On September 30, 1986, the Secretary awarded a $379,000, one-year contract for
the Network to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). On September 30,
1987, the Secretary renewed the contract for three years in the amount of $1.1 million
for fiscal year 1987, $1.2 million for fiscal year 1988, and approximately $1.5 million
for fiscal year 1989. The Secretary renewed the contract.again for three years on September 30, 1990. Waiting list registration fees raise additional funds for operation of the
Network.
NOTA also required the creation of a Scientific Registry to collect and analyze the
information "necessary to an ongoing evaluation of the scientific and clinical status of
organ transplantation." 3 On September 30, 1987, the DOT entered into a two-year,
$1.4 million per year contract with UNOS to establish and operate a Scientific Registry
database for organ transplantation. That contract was renewed for three years on September 30, 1990.
In the Transplant Amendments Act of 1990, Congress expanded the function of
the Network and the types of organizations which could participate in its operation. For
example, the operator of the Network is no longer required to be an organization
"which is not engaged in any activity unrelated to organ procurement. 8 s5 Instead, it
may be any organization "that has expertise in organ procurement and transplantation."" Additionally, the Act requires the Network to assist in the nationwide and equitable distribution of organs, work actively to increase the supply of organs, and report
annually to the Department of Health and Human
Services on the comparative costs and
87
patient outcomes at each transplant center.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

42 U.S.C. § 274(b) (1988).
Id. § 274(a).
42 U.S.C. § 274(a) (Supp. V 1993).
See Transplant Amendments Act of 1990, supra note 75.
42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(1)(A) (1988), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
Id. § 274(b)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(1)(A) (1988)).
Id. § 274(b) (Supp. V 1993).
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The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986" required all transplanting hospitals, as a condition of participation in Medicare and Medicaid, (and OPOs, as discussed above) to be members of and agree to abide by the rules of the OPTN. Because
of this development, the question was raised whether Congress' provision for the required membership of transplant centers and OPOs in the private OPTN (and the required compliance by these entities with the Network's rules) vested in the OPTN federal regulatory power. In the Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988,9 Congress
amended section 274 of the National Organ Transplant Act, to provide that the Secretary of Health and Human Services must establish procedures for receiving and evaluating comments from the public on the manner in which the Network is carrying out its
statutory responsibilities. In September 1989, Acting Surgeon General James Mason
notified Robert Corry, then President of UNOS, that UNOS rules and sanctions would
be subject to approval by the Department of Health and Human Services.'
The DOT renewed both the OPTN and the Scientific Registry contracts with
UNOS for three years beginning September 30, 1993. The OPTN contract reimburses
only fifteen percent-$2.37 million over three years-of the cost; other funds are raised
through fees charged to patients registered on the organ waiting lists. The Scientific
Registry contract provides for $4.9 million over three years. Both contracts contain new,
detailed requirements concerning the operation of the OPTN and its relationship with
the federal government. For example, the OPTN contract mandates creation of a data
committee, random waiting list audits, twenty-four-hour electronic access to UNOS
policies and by-laws and electronic access for the Health Resources and Services Administration, a communications plan, and professional education activities targeting
trauma physicians and surgeons, emergency room nurses, coroners, and medical examiners. The contract also imposes limits on registration fees for the computer waiting
lists."
d. Prohibitionon Sale
NOTA's fourth significant provision is the prohibition on buying or selling organs
for "valuable consideration." NOTA defines the term "valuable consideration" to exclude "the reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in
connection with the donation of the organ. '

88. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, supra note 80.
89. Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, 102 Stat. 3048 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 273, 274, 274a-274e (1988)).
90. Letter from James Mason, Assistant Secretary for Health and Acting Surgeon General, Department of
Health & Human Services, to Robert Corry, President, United Network for Organ Sharing (Sept. 22, 1989)
(on file with author).
91. New OPTN,Scientific Registry Contracts Foretell Increased Responsibilities, UNOS UPDATE, Nov.
1993, at 2, 9.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (1988).
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Congress apparently was galvanized into action banning the sale of human organs
and tissues largely in response to a plan by H. Barry Jacobs, who established a company in Virginia to broker human kidneys. According to press reports, Jacobs, whose
license to practice medicine was revoked in 1977 after a mail fraud conviction involving Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, intended to broker kidneys from healthy,
living donors at an agreed-upon price to which Jacobs would add $2,000 to $5,000 for
his services.93 Jacobs testified before Congress that he also intended to bring Third
World indigents to the United States so that the company could sell their kidneys. Congress responded by banning the sale of human organs and tissues.
The most notable feature of NOTA is what it does not do. Compared to the wealth
of regulation that surrounds the dispensing of prescription drugs or the provision of
medical care, the 1984 NOTA stands in stark contrast with its bare skeletal nature, the
relatively small funding authorized to carry out its programs, and the congressional
willingness that NOTA evidences to defer the standardization and regulation of organ
procurement, distribution, and transplantation services to private industry and to the
states. The decade since passage of NOTA, however, has witnessed significant expansion of the OPTN and of the DOT, greatly increased federal oversight of the OPTN,
OPOs, and transplanting hospitals, and new legislation promising further federal regulation.
2. Pending Organ Transplant Legislation and Regulation
Bills to reauthorize NOTA were introduced in both the House and the Senate in
1993. Although neither passed, due largely to the controversy surrounding health care
reform generally, the provisions of the two major bills reflected a widespread consensus
to substantially increase federal regulation of organ transplantation." For example, the
bills required the creation of a single national list for U.S. citizens and permanent residents and a single national list for foreign nationals. The OPTN would no longer be
free to allocate organs based on the consensus of medical professionals. Similarly, the
bills required each OPO to maintain a single waiting list and to centralize the waiting
lists for organs and the lists of potential bone marrow donors. The legislation subjected
OPTN user fees to approval by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The bills
also initiated a General Accounting Office investigation into procurement and distribution practices.
Whereas NOTA focused on transplant-related institutions (e.g., the OPTN, OPOs,
transplanting hospitals), the proposed legislation focused instead on individuals involved
in the transplant process such as donors, people on the waiting list, recipients, and their
families. For example, the bills reduced the OPTN board of directors from thirty-two to
twenty-one members and would have required that at least one-third of both the UNOS
board and OPO boards be recipients, recipient families, donor families, people waiting
for organs, and their families.

93. Margaret Engel, Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
1983, at A9.
94. 139 Cong. Rec. S14,529, S14,537 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); 139 Cong.
Rec. H4756 (daily ed. July 15, 1993) (statement of Rep. Franks).
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While the proposed legislation did not pass during the 1994 legislative year, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services finally did issue the comprehensive regulations
governing organ procurement and distribution first promised in 1989. 9- The September
8, 1994, release includes interim final rules governing OPOs and a notice of proposed
future rules applicable to the OPTN and transplant programs.

I. THE ROLE OF LAW
The expanding legal regime governing transplantation is almost wholly at odds
with the legal principles that are emerging in the larger health policy context. Health
policy analyst and law professor James Blumstein has characterized those trends in the
broad health policy context as "market-oriented" values, including the increased use of
financial incentives and enhanced respect for pluralism and decentralization.' The
government's organ transplant policy runs directly counter to these trends, emphasizing
instead altruism, centralization, and a weighing of competing interests that focuses on
the needs of donor and donor families to the virtual exclusion of the interests of wouldbe recipients whose lives hang in the balance and of society as a whole.9' Perhaps because it is so out of synch, that policy has proven to be ill-conceived, poorly implemented, underfunded, and rarely enforced.
In the case of organ donation, transplant law offers no incentives for individuals to
donate or for health professionals and institutions to facilitate donation. On the contrary,
the law largely impedes donation. For example, despite overwhelming public support
for transplantation, current law assumes that no one wishes to donate organs or tissues
upon death. According to a 1990 Gallup poll, ninety-four percent of Americans report
having heard or read about organ transplants; eighty-four percent believe that transplants
are successful in prolonging and improving the quality of life; eighty-nine percent said
that they were likely to honor loved ones' requests that their organs be donated after
their death." Still, the law presumes an unwillingness to donate.
The law provides two avenues around this presumption. First, an individual may
sign a donor card or otherwise indicate a willingness to donate." But many impediments prevent a donor card from having any effect. While every state and the District
of Columbia mention organ donation in connection with drivers licenses, only ten have
a donor card as part of the license." Of those states providing a check-off box,
95. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,482 (1994) (providing notice of
proposed rulemaking); Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions of Coverage for Organ Procurement
Organizations, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,500 (1994) (providing interim final rule).
96. See James F. Blumstein, The Case for Commerce in Organ Transplantation 5 (1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter The Case for Commerce); James F. Blumstein, Reevaluating the
Federal Role in Organ Transplantation Policy: The Relationship Between the Government and the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network, Address at the Impact of Changing Structure on Standards of
Health Care Conference, University of Virginia School of Law (June, 1989); James F. Blumstein,
Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 5 (1989).
97. See, e.g., The Case for Commerce, supra note 96, at 2-5.
98. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, THE U.S. PUBLIC's ArrTunEs TOWARD ORGAN TRANSPLANTs/ORGAN
DONATION 3 (1990).
99. UAGA § 2(a)-(c), 8A U.L.A. 19, 33-34 (1993).
100. Driver's License Survey Completed, UNOS UPDATE, Jan. 1992, at 1.Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois,
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twelve states and the District of Columbia cover their licenses in a nonmarkable laminated surface, so that the box must be checked prior to issuance of the license.'
Twenty-eight percent of those surveyed in the 1990 Gallup poll reported completing a
donor card-less than a third of those who claimed they were willing to donate"--and very few people who complete the cards have them in their possession at
the time of death. 3
Despite laws in most states placing an obligation on law enforcement officials to
search for a donor card on accident victims,"° "[n]o state has a comprehensive procedure to be followed by law enforcement and medical personnel who might be involved
with accident victims for determining if a potential donor is carrying a card."'" On
the contrary, procedures for emergency fire and hospital personnel quickly separate
injured people from their wallets and purses.
Even if a valid donor card is found and presented to the physician in charge of the
patient's care, doctors and hospitals fear professional criticism and legal liability if they
procure organs against the wishes of the next-of-kin. Donor cards are legally binding in
forty-eight states"° and health professionals who act on them are immune from liability under the UAGA in every state,1°7 but the cards have proven to be useless unless
next-of-kin approve the donation.
The second, and by far more important, means to obtain consent is from the nextof-kin." But federal and state routine inquiry and required request laws have proven
to be ineffective. One study found that thirty percent of the families of medically appro°
priate potential donors were never asked, despite the legal obligation to do so."W Another, more recent study found that forty-seven percent of medically suitable patients
were "overlooked" by hospital personnel.' 0 Even where requests are made, families
increasingly refuse to donate. In fact, "[t]he most common reason for lost donors ... is
denial of consent from next-of-kin. In 1989, more than half of those asked said no.'
The reasons for the increase in refusals are unclear, but certainly include both
inappropriate, ill-timed, and insensitive requests and declining public confidence in the

Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia are the states which have
donor cards as part of their licenses. Id.
101. Id. at 3.
102. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, supra note 98, at 3. 6.
103. Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Procurement: It's Not in the Cards, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984, at
10.
104. UAGA § 5(c), 8A U.L.A. 19, 47 (1993).
105. Thomas D. Overcast et al., Problems in the Identification of Potential Organ Donors, 251 JAMA
1559, 1561 (1984).
106. Developments-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1520, 1619 (1990). Florida
and Ndw York grant certain family members the right to veto the deceased's decision to donate organs. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 732.912(3) (West Supp. 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4301(3) (McKinney Supp. 1994).
107. UAGA § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. at 59-60.
108. Id. § 3(a), at 40.
109. ASSOcIATION OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT ORGANIZATIONS, OPO DIRECTORS SURVEY 1 (1989).
110. Steven E. Ross et al., Impact of a Required Request Law on Vital Organ Procurement, 30 J. TRAUMA 820 (1990).
111. Michael Evanisko, The Organ Donation Enigma... A Medical Crisis With a Cure, FOR PATIENTS
ONLY, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 14, 16.
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fundamental fairness of transplantation." 2 It comes as no surprise that if the government requires overworked health professionals to make a request that is difficult and
unpleasant, for which neither training nor reimbursement is offered, those requests are
not likely to succeed. And to date, there is no reported case of a government agency
seeking to enforce routine inquiry or required request laws.
The law thus presumes that a person does not want to donate and then minimizes
the likelihood that a donor's legally expressed desire to donate will be respected. Those
laws that encourage transplantation, such as required request statutes, frequently receive
inadequate resources to assure their implementation and little if any enforcement. In
short, the legal framework is stacked against donation.
IV. ALTERNATIVES

The legal system is not without options for addressing some of the problems with
transplantation that it has contributed to creating. Alternatives to the voluntary consent
and required request systems currently are used in various states and foreign countries.
The real question is whether sufficient political will exists to investigate and, where
appropriate, implement those alternatives.
A. Presumed Consent
The most dramatic alternative to the voluntary consent system-under which it is
presumed that a person does not wish to donate human body parts-is a "presumed
consent" system, under which the presumption is that the decedent does want to donate.
Instead of registering consent by carrying a donor card, under a presumed consent system one registers a desire not to donate by carrying a "non-donor" card or through
some other system.
Presumed consent systems are being used, to varying degrees, in sixteen
countries."' In Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, and Spain, doctors ask the nextof-kin whether they object to the donation. In Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
France, Israel, Poland, Singapore, and Switzerland, the law permits doctors to proceed
with removal of needed organs absent notice of a prior objection by either the decedent
or the next-of-kin, though in actual practice doctors seldom do." 4
Another form of presumed consent presumes the decedent's consent to donate
organ and tissues only after a "reasonable" or "diligent" search is made to determine
whether the decedent objected to donation prior to dying. Most likely, the search should

112. Id. at 16. Evanisko states that "an ineffective request was a key contributing factor." Id.
113. Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Norway,
Poland, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.
114. See Theodore Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft
Act, 68 B.U. L. REv. 681, 703 (1988); William M. Gerson, Note, Refining the Law of Organ Donation: Lessons from the French Law of Presumed Consent, 19 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1013 (1987); A. Cantaluppi et
al., Legal Aspects of Organ Procurement in Different Countries, 16 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 102 (1984);
Frank P. Stuart et al., Brain Death Laws and Patterns of Consent to Remove Organs for Transplantation
From Cadavers in the United States and 28 Other Countries, 31 TRANSPLANTATION 238, 239 (1981).
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involve trying to notify the decedent's next-of-kin to give the next-of-kin an opportunity
to rebut the presumption of consent.
This alternative is followed in a number of states which permit coroners to remove
body parts for research or transplant purposes from cadavers within the coroner's jurisdiction or for which an autopsy is required, or both. For instance, twenty-one states
currently have some form of presumed consent law that applies to the removal of corneas for transplantation." 5 These laws generally provide that a coroner or medical examiner may remove the corneas from a cadaver in the course of a legally-required
autopsy, provided that a need for the tissues is demonstrated and that no objection from
either the decedent or the next-of-kin is known. Many of these states require that before
removing corneas, the coroner or medical examiner make a reasonable search to determine whether such objection exists. Seventeen states permit the removal of pituitary
glands under similar conditions." 6
The revised UAGA permits a coroner or medical examiner to remove body parts
from a cadaver within the official's custody provided that the parts are needed, and a
"reasonable effort" is made first to determine if the decedent had objected to making an
anatomical gift.117 The UAGA also permits the local public health officer to release a
cadaver that is not already within the custody of the coroner or medical examiner for
the purpose of removing organs and tissues for transplantation or therapy."'
B. Compensation
Another significant alternative to elicit donations is the use of financial incentives.
the purchase and sale of human organs and tissues for
As noted above, NOTA prohibits
"valuable consideration.""..9 This provision acts as a positive prohibition on the use of

115. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-851 (1993); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 27491.47 (West 1988); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 30-10-620 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-281 (West 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 4712 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.9185 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-23-6 (1991); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110 , para. 351 (1991); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 311.187 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1990); MD. CODE
ANN. EST. & TRusTs § 4-509.1 (1991); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 113, § 14 (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.10202 (West 1992); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1993); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-4813 (1990); N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4222 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-391 (1992); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (Baldwin 1987); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 693.012 (West 1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-287 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.08.300 (West 1985); W. VA. CODE
§ 16-19-3a (1991).
116. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-320 (Michie 1987); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 27491.46 (West 1988);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-10-621 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-281 (West 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-1033 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2855 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. § 390.36 (1992); MisS.
CODE ANN. § 41-61-71 (1993); Mo. REv. STAT. § 58.770 (1986); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-4813 (1990); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4222 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.53 (Baldwin
1987); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 944.1 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-30-301 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 510 (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-287 (Michie 1992); WASH. Rev. CODE § 68.50.106 (1992 &
Supp. 1993).
117. UAGA § 4(a), 8A U.L.A. at 43.
118. Id. § 4(b), at 43.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1988). The term "organ" is defined by this section of the Act to include: "the
human (including fetal) kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin, ...
and any other human organ ...specified by the Secretary of Health and Human Services by regulation." Id.
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financial incentives to encourage organ donation, even in the face of dramatic organ
shortages and increasing waiting lists. This section was adopted without study of the
possible consequences and without justification for the exclusion of financial incentives
from this one area of medical practice. Moreover, the text of the prohibition permits
payments to everyone involved in the transplant process except the donor and his or her
family. The government's determination not to allow payment for organs and tissues
has restricted the development of any type of financial incentive for enhancing the
supply of organs, despite the widely recognized fact that the supply of transplantable
organs falls far short of the need. The decision has raised concerns about the seriousness of the government's commitment to saving lives with transplantation and the fundamental fairness of the transplant system. The public cannot be expected to tolerate
indefinitely payment to everyone except organ donors. Consider this item from the
February 21, 1991, UPI newswire:
MOORE, Okla. (UPI)-Susan Sutton's heart offered extended life to an
Oklahoma City man, her liver was donated to a patient in Pennsylvania and
her comeas went to Texas for eye transplants.
Her bones will be used for reconstructive surgery and some of her skin
will provide grafts for victims of bums.
The rest of her body was to be buried Wednesday in an unmarked
grave.
Her mother, Judy Sutton of Moore, said it isn't right that her 27-yearold daughter, who died Friday of a self-inflicted gunshot wound, should be
buried in a pine box without a marker because her family cannot pay for
anything better."
There are alternatives to the outright sale of a body part. Examples include: a
controlled, government-regulated market;' 2 ' tax incentives;' allowing the hospital in
which the donor died to reduce the donor's hospital bill by an amount not to exceed the
value of the organ or tissue removed; a discount on insurance premiums in exchange
for a binding commitment to donate body parts upon death, for which the insurance
company would be reimbursed by the hospital or the government; payment to the charity of the donor's choice;123 preferential access to an organ or tissue bank; u and
credits for college tuition or vocational training expenses." 2 Compensation may not

§ 274e(c)(1). This definition obscures the difference between organs and tissues, and indicates that federal
regulations dealing solely with organs, at least with regard to the prohibition against selling organs, apply to
tissues as well.
120. Organ Donor Goes to Unmarked Grave, UPI, Feb. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File.
121. See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 57 (1989); Richard Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery Market
for Transplant Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 483, 489 (1986).
122. See generally Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 842, 856
(1973).
123. Schwindt & Vining, supra note 121, at 495.
124. Id.; see also Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182, 1218 (1974).
125. Schwindt & Vining, supra note 121, at 496.
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need to reflect the approximate value of the donated organs or tissues in order to provide an effective incentive for donation. Even a relatively insignificant payment may
serve as a sufficient incentive or a symbolic motivator to cause those people who are
already predisposed to donate to execute a donor card.
Debate over what property interests exist in the human body exacerbates the issue
of incentives. The issue should be of more than passing interest-not only because of
its profound ethical implications-but because the current confusion over whether a
donor has property rights in donated organs and tissues is a significant impediment to
the success of the altruistic supply system."
Professors Richard Schwindt and Aidan Vining have written that "[p]roblems
emerge when something of value, in this case a human organ, is not clearly owned by
anyone." 7 If human organs and tissues were treated with the same official respect as
real property-which, for instance, the police will act immediately and forcefully to
protect upon the death of the owner-a far greater supply of transplantable body parts
would result. Because no automatic transferal of property interests in organs or tissues
upon death to would-be recipients exists, the legal system does not protect the interests
of recipients. People die for lack of those organs, but the legal system treats those organs as having no value.
Ill-defined legal interests in human bodies affect financial incentives for organ
procurement and transplantation, developing mechanical and chemical means for prolonging organ viability, developing medical treatments involving transplantation, research using donated organs and tissues, insurance coverage for transplant facilities and
procedures, and legal standing for enforcing procurement and processing standards.
C. Medical Alternatives
Important medical advances may help reduce the shortage of organs, but each of
these poses significant legal, as well as ethical, issues. For example, one issue to reevaluate is how to measure the absence of brain activity in order to determine death. The
Uniform Determination of Death Act merely refers to "accepted medical standards," but
those standards vary from state to state and, in fact, from hospital to hospital. Some
medical standards still require that two electroencephalograms be performed twenty-four
hours apart. If approximately fifty percent of all potential donors succumb within twenty-four hours of admission to a hospital, however, one-half of the potential pool of
:
donors is ineligible to donate under such a standard."
This standard is particularly important when we consider the use of anencephalic
infants as organ donors. Anencephaly is "uniformly and rapidly fatal,"'" but because
126. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990) (stating that whatever property interest in his cells the plaintiff at one time possessed, the court doubted whether he retained any
ownership interest following their removal; however, "a physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a
medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent,
disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his
medical judgment").
127. Schwindt & Vining, supra note 121, at 486.
128. Roger W. Evans et al., Donor Availability as the Primary Determinantof the Future of Heart Transplantation, 255 JAMA 1892 (1986).
129. Dale L. Moore, Anencephalic Infants as Sources of Transplantable Organs, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 189,
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of the current brain death criteria, it is often impossible to determine whether any infant
less than seven days old-much less an anencephalic infant-has suffered "irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem."'" All too often, by the time the criteria are met, the infant's organs have become unusable for
transplantation. The concern is not how death is defined; rather, it is how death is determined.
The use of living donors, both related and unrelated, should be reexamined. Once
cadaveric transplantation became routine, the medical community largely abandoned the
use of living kidney donors. Yet studies suggest that kidneys from living related donors
make better transplants and that the procedure poses little risk to the donor. 3' Moreover, the transplantation of portions of livers from living, related donors has the very
real potential of expanding the supply of organs.
Xenotransplantation-the use of animal organs and cells--offers increasing promise.'32 Dr. Thomas Starzl's transplantation of a baboon liver into a thirty-five-year-old
man with hepatitis B in 1992, like the case of Baby Fae years earlier, has raised both
hopes for the future of xenotransplantation and a storm of ethical debate.
Medical technology now makes it possible to remove kidneys from non-heart-beating cadaveric donors.' 33 To do so, however, immediately after death, physicians must
insert a catheter and perform a cooling procedure necessary for subsequent salvaging of
the kidneys. Performing these procedures on a cadaver which neither consented to donation while alive nor for whom consent was obtained from next-of-kin raises important
issues. In fact, each of these advances, like transplantation itself, raises serious legal and
ethical issues.
V.

THE ROLE OF LAWYERS

Lawyers have at least three roles to play if we are to eliminate the current ambiguity surrounding the impact of law on transplantation and contribute to resolving the fatal
shortage of transplantable organs. First, lawyers must help investigate alternatives to
current transplant practice and, where necessary, participate in altering the existing legal
structure to make it possible for new procedures to be implemented.
Second, because of relationships of trust between lawyers and clients, the legal
profession has an unusual opportunity to raise the issue of donation, to provide accurate
information concerning the legal fight of every adult to donate, and to both provide
advice to and act on behalf of clients to assure that a decision to donate is followed
when medically appropriate.

189 (1990).
130. UDDA § 1, 12 U.L.A. 414, 414 (Supp. 1994).
131. C.F. Anderson et al., The Risks of Unilateral Nephrectomy: Status of Kidney Donors 10 to 20 Years
Postoperatively, 60 MAYO CLINIC PRoc. 367 (1985).
132. J.S. Najarian, Overview of In Vivo Xenotransplantation Studies: Prospects for the Future, 24 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 733 (1992).
133. David Anaise et al., An Approach to Organ Salvage From Non-Heartbeating Cadaver Donors Under
Existing Legal and Ethical Requirements for Transplantation, 49 TRANSPLANTATION 290 (1990).
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The third and most important role for lawyers to play, however, is guaranteeing the
integrity of the organ procurement, distribution, and transplantation system. For transplantation to truly succeed, the public-as citizens and as potential donors-must have
confidence in the basic fairness and accuracy of the systems that regulate transplantation
in this country. A Caucasian on the kidney waiting list has a one-in-six chance of transplantation within one year of being listed." An African-American has a one-in-thirteen chance. 3 ' On average, African-Americans wait twice as long as Caucasians."
While African-Americans constitute twelve percent of the population in the United
States, they account for approximately thirty percent of patients on the national kidney
waiting list. The organ distribution system does not appear to be fair. Not surprisingly,
studies show that African-Americans and other minorities are far less likely than Caucasians to donate.'
Similarly, no one is placed on the national waiting list for an organ unless he or
she demonstrates the ability to pay-the so-called "green screen." Transplants are very
expensive-in many cases over $100,000.2 In addition, permanent maintenance on
immunosuppressive drugs and other medical care associated with the transplant may
cost between $17,000 and $68,000 annually.'39 According to Roger Evans, organ acquisition charges are increasing far above inflation-sixty-four percent for hearts and
sixty-two percent for livers since 1985-and costs vary widely--between $11,289 to
$24,161 for a kidney."4 The efficiency of OPOs in obtaining organs varies as well,
with OPOs obtaining organs from between twenty-five and ninety percent of potential
donors.' 4' "Some transplant hospitals routinely mark up by as much as 200 percent the
charges that are billed by organ procurement organizations."'42
While Medicare pays for most kidney transplants, and Medicare, Medicaid, and
private insurers now cover most other transplants, an estimated sixty million people do
not have insurance that covers transplants. They can give organs and tissues, but are
virtually ineligible to receive them. Approximately thirty-seven million Americans have
no effective access to health care at all. Nonetheless, although they are denied access-to transplantation and even to basic health services-we do not hesitate to ask for
their organs. "It becomes," in the words of Harvard immunologist Terry Strom, "the
rich buying health at the expense of the poor."' 43 The law has an important role to
play in addressing these inequities-both perceived and real-in the transplant system.
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In addition to fairness, public confidence also depends on the system being rational. The federal government's policy of paying for immunosuppressive drugs only for
the first eighteen months-recently extended to thirty-six months M-following the
transplant operation does little to bolster public confidence. Without a lifetime of daily
doses of immunosuppressive, antirejection drugs-for which the government will not
pay-the patient rejects the donated kidney and must be transplanted again-a procedure for which Medicare will pay. Similarly, the steadfast refusal of the government
and transplant professionals to consider creative, if provocative, solutions to the dramatic shortage of organs does not build faith in the system. What do we say to Susan
Sutton's mother: "Sorry, we'd like to help but Congress won't let us." It won't fly, as
we are learning from declining consent rates throughout the nation.
Members of the Bar are uniquely skilled in influencing, critiquing, and challenging
the government's legislative and regulatory activities. Attorneys are well-trained to
spark a reexamination of laws and regulatory policies that are not working for the thousands who die while waiting for organs and the even greater number who are never
listed. Lawyers can bring actions to assure that each individual's legal right to donate is
respected. They can push for enforcement of required request and routine inquiry laws
or argue for their repeal if they are ill-conceived. Lawyers can bring their experience in
other health policy arenas to help design creative alternatives to the current system and
lobby for the necessary legislative or administrative changes to see them implemented.
VI. CONCLUSION

State and federal laws relating to transplantation could aptly be described as
schizophrenic. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and the Uniform Determination of
Death Act created the essential groundwork for widespread clinical transplantation. Yet
states have resisted enforcing requirements contained in these laws, such as routine
inquiry and required request. Similarly, Congress' creation of the National Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network and of organ procurement organizations served
vital needs in the procurement and distribution of organs. However, Congress reflected
an apparent reluctance to commit adequate government resources or funds to these important tasks. Since passage of NOTA in 1984, Congress and the Department of Health
and Human Services have steadily increased the regulatory mandate of the OPTN and
regulation of the OPTN, OPOs, and transplanting hospitals, while waiting more than
four years (thus far) to actually issue the regulations with which transplant-related organizations must comply. Congress has stressed consensus in decision making and the
important role of patients, donors, and their families, while also pushing for increased
centralization.
As was the case more than twenty years ago, when lawmakers were debating the
legal definition of death and the ways in which an individual could consent to donation,
transplantation today is confronted with significant issues that require, at least in part, a
regulatory response. Administering the transplant system fairly and efficiently, allocat-
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ing scarce organs, and increasing the supply of organs for transplantation all urgently
demand the attention of lawmakers and regulators. In a very real sense, transplantation
today is constrained not by medical issues, but by legal ones, and their resolution is
essential to save lives and reduce human suffering. Lawyers alone will not find right
answers, but-as people well-placed in society-they must be part of asking the right
questions.

